EATON COUNTY CHILD CUSTODY JUDGE TOLD TO DO IT OVER.Comments by Flint Divorce Lawyer Terry Bankert, 235-1970

　
The Eaton County Divorce Court, Family Division, 1999 Child Custody dispute and order granting joint legal custody was done wrong because there was not a child custody change in circumstances determination hearing. Flint Divorce Attorney Terry Bankert, a subscriber to Dump My Spouse . Com, reviews this issue. If you need information on you child custody, child support or divorce call 1-810-235-1970 , Divorce Lawyer Terry Bankert or see the link below.

CHILD CUSTODY DECISIONS ARE HARD ON CHILDREN, PARENTS AND SOMETIMES THE LAWYERS.

DO NOT THINK YOU ARE ALONE. Another chapter in the bitter child custody battle between NBA star Dwayne Wade and his wife played out in a Chicago court room Friday with Mrs. Wade firing her ninth attorney. [3] ANOTHER ON BITES THE DUST
The FAMILY COURT trial had been set to get under way June 7, but at a hearing Friday, Cook County Circuit Judge Marya Nega , DIVORCE AND CHILD CUSTODY,granted what she described as a final postponement after allowing Mrs. Wade to dismiss her most recent lawyer. [3]

NOW BACK TO MICHIGAN
　
The State of Michigan Court of Appeals in the case concerning FATHER JOHN E. WILBER,
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant- appellant and MOTHER Skye D. Carter Defendant /counter-Plaintiff-Appell in an UNPUBLISHED DECISION ,May 20, 2010,v No. 293804 DECIDED ON THE ORDERS OF A LOCAL COURT. The child custody case was from Eaton Circuit Court. That courts case number is LC No. 99-000882-DP. The information that follows is altered for this media presentation. The original case can be found at cite [1]

In this EATON COUNTY CHILD CUSTODY custody dispute, p FATHER plaintiff appeals an order granting joint legal custody of the parties’ minor child (DOB 4/20/99).

THE EATON COUNTY COURT WAS WRONG IN A CHILD CUSTODY DECISION
Because the trial court erred in awarding custody without determining a change in circumstances, just cause, the existence of an established custodial environment, and without considering the best interest factors, we reverse the order and remand for further proceedings.

DUE PROCESS AND STATE LAW VIOLATED

FATHER Plaintiff argues that the court erred in modifying a prior custody award without a motion being submitted and without a finding that there was proper cause or a change in circumstances to justify the modification.

SOME HAVE BEEN TRYING TO CHANGE THE LAW BUT WILL NOT BE ON THE BALLOT NOT THIS YEAR.

Robert Kerr of Lansing, who launched an effort to require circuit courts to award joint child custody unless there's convincing legal evidence that one of the parents is unfit, said the hurdle to collect 304,100 signatures was too high. He's hoping a bill that would achieve similar aims will get a fair hearing in the House Judiciary Committee. [4]

DOCTRINE FOLLOWED

A custody order must be affirmed on appeal unless the trial court’s
findings were against the great weight of the evidence, the court committed a palpable abuse of
discretion, or the court made a clear legal error on a major issue. MCL 722.28; Berger v Berger,
277 Mich App 700, 705; 747 NW2d 336 (2008). A trial court commits legal error when it
incorrectly chooses, interprets, or applies the law. Id. at 706.

THE CHILD CUSTODY ACT AND EATON COUNTY, THERE ARE RULES A JUDGE MUST FOLLOW.

The Child Custody Act of 1970 (CCA), MCL 722.21 et seq., governs child custody
disputes between parents, agencies, or third parties. The purpose of the CCA is to promote the
best interest of children, and it is to be liberally construed. MCL 722.26(1); Harvey v Harvey,
470 Mich 186, 192; 680 NW2d 835 (2004). The CCA creates “presumptions and standards by
which competing claims to the right of custody are to be judged, sets forth procedures to be
followed in litigation regarding such claims, and authorizes the forms of relief available in the
circuit court.”. Ruppel v Lesner, 421 Mich 559, 565; 364 NW2d 665 (1984).

WHAT THE EATON COURT GAVE FATHER IT TOOK AWAY IN ERROR

FATHER Plaintiff states that the court changed custody because it issued an order on March 31,
2009, awarding plaintiff sole legal and physical custody of the child and then, on August 11,
2009, ordered “[d]efendant’s joint legal custody of the minor child is restored. Hence both
parties shall now share joint custody of the minor child.”

FATHERS RIGHTS WERE TAKEN AWAY AT A REVIEW HEARING

The August 11, 2009, order followed a hearing that was scheduled in the order dated March 31, 2009, to review the matter.

THE EATON COUNTY COURT HAD MADE SEVERAL CHANGES TO CHILD LEGAL CUSTODY

Since the original February 2000 award of joint legal and physical custody, the court
changed the custody arrangement several times.

EATON COUNTY COURT ISSUED A TEMPORARY ORDER PENDING REVIEW

05/2005-temp physical to father

In May 2005, after motions from both parties, the court awarded temporary physical custody to plaintiff pending a referee hearing.

02/2006- next review hearing

After a referee hearing and a motion by defendant, the court ordered that the parties again have joint legal and physical custody, and set a review hearing for February 2006.

12/2006- led to motions and a referee hearing
Following motions by both parties and a referee hearing, the court awarded temporary physical custody to plaintiff and suspended defendant’s parenting time pending further orders and a referee hearing in December 2006.

02/2007 continued fathers custody mothers supervision

In February 2007, after a referee hearing, the court continued temporary physical custody
with plaintiff and supervised visits with defendant.

07/2008, mother gets parenting told to move

In July 2008, after defendant petitioned for parenting time and plaintiff sought child support, the court ordered parenting time for defendant and required defendant to secure different living conditions within four months.

03/31/2009, father granted father sole legal and physical

In a March 31 2009, order, after another motion by plaintiff to limit defendant’s parenting time and a scheduled review hearing at which the court interviewed the child, the court granted plaintiff sole legal and physical custody and scheduled the matter for review in August 2009.

08/11/2009 mothers joint legal custody restored, saying it intended too all along.

After the review hearing and a second interview with the child, the court ordered on August 11,

2009, that defendant’s joint legal custody was restored. The court also scheduled a hearing to review child support.

During the August 2009 review hearing, the court reviewed the history of the case and
indicated that the intent had long been to expand defendant’s involvement in the child’s life, but
that the real question was whether to reinstate the original joint physical custody arrangement of the parties.

EATON COUNTY COURT WAS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH MOTHER BUT MOTHER WA BEGING TO ACT IN A STANDARD MANNER.

The court indicated that it was not entirely comfortable with defendant’s
involvement with the child in the past but that defendant began to resume more typical parenting time.

EATON COUNTY COURT SAID IT WAS CONSIDERING CHANGING CUSTODY BECAUSE FATHER WAS MAKING IT DIFFICULT FOR MOTHER?

The court indicated that it was likely to restore joint legal custody because plaintiff was
relying on sole legal custody in order to make things difficult for defendant.

DID EATON COUNTY THINK IT WAS MANAGEING THIS CHILD CUSTODY ARRAINGEMENT?

Because the court issued temporary orders on May 25, 2005, and February 16, 2007,
scheduled hearings to review the matter, made comments regarding its general intention to
restore the original custody arrangement, and in its August 11, 2009, order referred to restoring
joint custody rather than awarding custody, it is possible that the court believed it was managing
the custody of the parties with temporary orders to preserve, and not modify, the original custody arrangement as intended.

WE WANT PARENTS TO FEEL FREE TO LET THE OTHER PARENT HAVE MORE TIME WHEN THEY ARE IN NEED.

Indeed, this Court has affirmed the “good public policy to encourage
parents to transfer custody of their children to others temporarily when they are in difficulty by
returning custody when they have solved their difficulty.” Straub v Straub, 209 Mich App 77,
81; 530 NW2d 125 (1995).

TOO MUCH SPECULATION

However, under these circumstances, any finding that the court was
modifying temporary orders until joint custody could be restored would be based on speculation.

SOME ORDERS WERE CALLED TEMPORARY SOME WERE NOT.

Only two of the court’s six orders changing the custody arrangement of the parties were
characterized as temporary. The August 11, 2009, order followed a March 31, 2009, order
granting sole legal and physical custody to plaintiff that did not state that it was a temporary
order.

WHAT DOES THE LAW SAY?

MCL 722.27(1) provides in part:
If a child custody dispute has been submitted to the circuit court as an
original action under this act or has arisen incidentally from another action in the
circuit court or an order or judgment of the circuit court, for the best interests of
the child the court may do 1 or more of the following:
* * *
(c) Modify or amend its previous judgments or orders for proper cause shown or
because of change of circumstances until the child reaches 18 years of age and,
subject to section 5b of the support and parenting time enforcement act, 1982 PA
295, MCL 552.605b, until the child reaches 19 years and 6 months of age. The
court shall not modify or amend its previous judgments or orders or issue a new
order so as to change the established custodial environment of a child unless there
is presented clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the
child.

EATON COUNTY CHANGES IN CHILD CUSTODY MUST BE BASED ON CAUSE OR CHANGE.

Thus, the party seeking a change of custody must first establish proper cause or change of
circumstances by a preponderance of evidence. In re AP, 283 Mich App 574, 600; 770 NW2d
403 (2009). If a party fails to establish proper cause or change of circumstances, the trial court
may not hold a child custody hearing. Corporan v Henton, 282 Mich App 599, 603-604; 766
NW2d 903 (2009).

EATON COUNTY FAMILY COURT DID NOT CONSIDER THESE THRESHOLDS

Here, there was no discussion of the threshold question of proper cause or a change in
circumstances during the August 5, 2009, hearing or in the August 11, 2009, order to consider a
change in the March 31, 2009, custody order.

SOMETIMES JUDGES FORGET THEY ARE THE REFEREES OF AN ADVESARIAL SYSTEM BASED UPON MOTIONS AND RESPONSES

Neither party filed a motion to change custody following the March 31, 2009, order. A trial court must determine if the moving party has shown that the conditions surrounding custody of the child, which have or could have a significant effect on the child’s well-being, have materially changed since the entry of the last custody order. Brausch v Brausch, 283 Mich App 339, 355-356; 770 NW2d 77 (2009).
　
Here there was no such motion and no findings presented on the matter.

THE EATON COUNTY CHILD CUSTODY JUDGE WAS SUPPOSED TO DETERMINE IF A CUSTODIAL ENVIRONMENT EXISTED.

Additionally, the first step in considering a change in custody is to determine whether an
established custodial environment exists. It is only then that the court can determine what
burden of proof is applied. Curless v Curless, 137 Mich App 673, 676; 357 NW2d 923 (1984).1

THE EATON COUNTY CHILD CUSTODY JUDGE DID NOT LOOK AT THE CHILDS BEST INTEREST ON THE COURTS RECORD.

Further, above all, custody disputes are to be resolved in the best interests of the child, as
measured by the factors set forth in MCL 722.23. Eldred v Ziny, 246 Mich App 142, 150; 631
NW2d 748 (2001). Generally, the trial court must consider and explicitly state its findings and
conclusions regarding each factor and the failure to do so is reversible error. Rittershaus v
Rittershaus, 273 Mich App 462, 475; 730 NW2d 262 (2007); Daniels v Daniels, 165 Mich App
1
HERE IS WHAT A CUSTODIAL ENVIRONMENT IS.

According to MCL 722.27(1)(c), a custodial environment is established if: “over an appreciable
time the child naturally looks to the custodian in that environment for guidance, discipline, the
necessities of life, and parental comfort. The age of the child, the physical environment, and the
inclination of the custodian and the child as to permanency of the relationship shall also be
considered.” 726, 730; 418 NW2d 924 (1988).

ITS NOT A MIGHT DO IT’S A MUST DO RESPONSIBILITY.

Even in fairness to the parties this standard cannot be abrogated. Soumis v Soumis, 218 Mich App 27, 34; 553 NW2d 619 (1996).

THE EATON COUNTY JUDGE DID NOT DISCUSS THESE ISSUES

In the instant case, there was no discussion or findings regarding an established custodial
environment, the standard of proof required to change custody, or the statutory best interest
factors in the courts order or during the hearing.

THERE IS NOTHING NEW ABOUT THE COURT OF APPEALS EXPECTING THE EATON COUNTY JUDGE TO FOLLOW THE LAW OF CHILD CUSTODY.

This Court has consistently held that when deciding a custody matter the trial court must evaluate each of the factors contained in MCL 722.23 and state a conclusion on each, thereby determining the best interests of the child. Thompson v Thompson, 261 Mich App 353, 363; 683 NW2d 250 (2004).

THESE LAWS PROTECT THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF PARENTS AND CHILDREN AND ARE NOT TO BE IGNORED.

It is vitally important for the protection of the fundamental rights of the parties involved to have some indicia on the record showing that the court has satisfied itself that its custody determination was in the child’s best interests. In re AP, 283 Mich App at 608.

SOCIETY WANTS TO MINIMIZE DISRUPTIZE CHANGES IN A CHILDS LIFE.

The goal of the CCA is to minimize unwarranted and disruptive changes of custody orders, except under the most compelling circumstances. See Foskett v Foskett, 247 Mich App 1, 6; 634 NW2d 363 (2001).

SINCE THE EATON COUNTY COURT DID NOT MAKE A CHILD CUSTODY DECISION RIGHT IT MUST DO IT AGAIN.

When a trial court fails to consider custody issues in accordance with the mandates set
forth in MCL 722.23 and make reviewable findings of fact, the proper remedy is to remand for a
new child custody hearing. Foskett, 247 Mich App at 12. Also, where this Court concludes that
the trial court committed clear legal error on a major issue, the appropriate remedy is to remand
for reevaluation. Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 888-889; 526 NW2d 889 (1994);
Rittershaus, 273 Mich App at 475-476.

THE MICHIGAN STATE COURT OF APPEALS , We therefore reverse and remand. On remand, the EATON COUNTY trial court should consider up-to-date information, including the child’s current and reasonable preferences and any other changes in circumstances arising since the original custody order.
Fletcher, 447 Mich at 889.

ORDER OF THE MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
FATHER MAY GET COSTS FROM MOTHER
Plaintiff, being the prevailing
party, may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.
MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS PANEL Douglas B. Shapiro, Kathleen Jansen, Pat M. Donofrio

Posted here by
Terry Bankert
http://attorneybankert.com
Or
http://dumpmyspouse.com
SEE
[1]
STATE C O U R T O F A P P E A L S,JOHN E. WILBER, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant-
Appellant, UNPUBLISHED,May 20, 2010,v No. 293804,Eaton Circuit Court,SKYE D. CARTER, LC No. 99-000882-DP,Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff-,Appellee.Before: SHAPIRO, P.J., and JANSEN and DONOFRIO, JJ.PER CURIAM.
At http://www.michbar.org/opinions/appeals/2010/052010/45902.pdf
[2]
Modifications have been made by Terry Bankert shown as CAP HEADLING TYPE or cited as (trb) other sources made be included and cited. The oddities of this article are for SEO.
[3]
http://abclocal.go.com/wls/story?section=news/local&id=7467958
[4]
http://www.detnews.com/article/20100527/POLITICS02/5270417/1024/POLITICS03/Citizen-petitions-unlikely-to-make-it-onto-ballot

MICHIGAN DIVORCE PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION , DIVORCE LAWYER COMMENTS

MICHIGAN SAGINAW COUNTY DIVORCE PROPERTY DIVISION REVIEWED BY ATTORNEY TERRY BANKERT A DIVORCE LAWYER. For immediate help with your family law questions call 810-235-1970.

PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION FROM A THE SAGINAW DIVORCE PROPERTY DIVISION CASE

CHERI L. WOODINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v KAMRAN SHOKOOHI, Defendant-Appellee/Cross- Appellant.
Docket No(s) 288923, Published 05/04/2010
Trial Court/lower Court Saginaw County Circuit Court.
Trial Court Judge Robert L. KaczarekLower Court Docket No(s) LC No. 06-060841-DM
(This opinion has been modified for media presentation)
To see original document, http://coa.courts.mi.gov/documents/opinions/final/coa/20100504_c288923_61_288923opn.pdf

SAAD, J.
Plaintiff Cheri Woodington appeals the trial court’s judgment of divorce. She argues that the trial court made inadequate findings of fact in regard to the value of marital property, the date of valuation, and the status of certain assets as marital or separate property. She also raises issues concerning discovery, spousal support, and attorney fees. Defendant Kamran Shokoohi cross-appeals and contends that the trial court erred in failing to divide the property in accordance with the parties’ prenuptial agreement. We affirm some aspects of the trial court’s judgment; however, because the inadequacy of the trial court’s findings on several of these matters precludes meaningful appellate review, we remand for further proceedings.
　
　
　
II. SAWMILL CREEK PROPERTY

Plaintiff maintains that the trial court erred in finding that the real property defendant purchased on Sawmill Creek was not a marital asset. We disagree.

We review for clear error a trial court’s findings of fact regarding whether a particular asset qualifies as marital or separate property. See McNamara v Horner, 249 Mich App 177, 182-183; 642 NW2d 385 (2002). Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when this Court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Ackerman v Ackerman, 197 Mich App 300, 302; 495 NW2d 173 (1992). We accord special deference to a trial court's factual findings that were based on witness credibility. Draggoo, 223 Mich App at 429.

A “trial court’s first consideration when dividing property in divorce proceedings is the determination of marital and separate assets.” Reeves v Reeves, 226 Mich App 490, 493-494; 575 NW2d 1 (1997). Marital assets are those that came “to either party by reason of the marriage. . . .” MCL 552.19. Generally, marital assets are subject to being divided between the parties, but separate assets may not be invaded. McNamara, 249 Mich App at 183.

Plaintiff presented evidence that the Sawmill Creek property was a marital asset acquired by defendant before she filed for divorce, but defendant presented evidence that he bought the property for and on behalf of his sister, with his sister’s money. This issue presented a question of the credibility of the witnesses. Although the trial court might have found that defendant’s explanation of his involvement in the Sawmill property purchase was not credible, and that he was concealing the property’s true status as a marital asset, it gave credence to his explanation.

This finding was not clearly erroneous because it was based on the trial court’s findings as to the credibility of witnesses. Draggoo, 223 Mich App at 429.

Posted here by
Terry Bankert
http://attorneybankert.com/

see
[1]
CHERI L. WOODINGTON, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v KAMRAN SHOKOOHI, Defendant-Appellee/Cross- Appellant.
Docket No(s) 288923, Published 05/04/2010
Trial Court/lower Court Saginaw County Circuit Court.
Trial Court Judge Robert L. KaczarekLower Court Docket No(s) LC No. 06-060841-DM
　
[2]
CAP HEADLINES OR (trb)
Terry Bankert
http://attorneybankert.com/
MISC
FOOTNOTES
1 Staple v Staple, 241 Mich App 562, 566; 616 NW2d 219 (2000). We note that the holding in Staple is inapplicable because Staple applies “to judgments entered pursuant to the parties’ own negotiated settlement agreements, not to alimony provisions of a judgment entered after an adjudication on the merits.” Id. at 569.

GRANDPARENTS GET TO VISIT THE BABIES!

GRANDPARENTS! Flint Divorce Attorney Terry Bankert discusses several Issues: \

Tuscola COUNTY grandparents get visitation;

HERE Flint Divorce Lawyer looks at whether the trial court properly awarded plaintiffs grandparent visitation time after the death of their son (the children's father); MCL 722.27b(1)(c);

GrandParents Rights Lawyer reviews Whether the trial court had the authority to order grandparenting time; MCL 722.27b(3)(b); Bowman v. Coleman;

BE Careful what your agreed to!Stipulation as to visitation; Koron v. Melendy; Agreement read in open court under MCR 2.507(G); Massachusetts Indem. & Life Ins. Co. v. Thomas; Wagner v. Myers;

MOM HADE AN ATTORNEY!
Whether defendant's ( mothers )due process rights were violated; Lewis v. Legrow;
Whether the plaintiffs-grandparents proved the mother s decision to lessen grandparenting time created a substantial risk of harm to the children under MCL 722.27(4)(b)

WHERE DID THIS CASE COME FROM-TUSCOLA COUNTY MI
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished 05/11/2010)
Case Name: McQuillan v. Sanback
Tuscola Circuit Court
LC no 08-024762-DZ
e-Journal Number: 45763
Judge(s): Per Curiam - Talbot, Fitzgerald, and M.J. Kelly

MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS SAYS GRANDPARENTS GET PARENTING TIME
Concluding the plaintiffs-grandparents were statutorily entitled to seek a grandparenting time order after the death of their son Joshua, the children's father, and the defendant-mother stipulated with them to the grandparenting time plan, which ostensibly worked for all parties, the court held the trial court properly entered an order memorializing the agreement and denied the mother's motion for a JNOV or new trial.
The Grandparents son died as the result of injuries sustained in a car accident.

DID YOU KNOW?“A child’s grandparent may seek a grandparenting time order . . . [if] the child’s parent who is a child of the grandparents is deceased.” MCL 722.27b(1)(c). Here, plaintiffs are the grandparents of the two minor children. Because their son is deceased, plaintiffs are entitled to seek a grandparenting time order in accordance with MCL 722.27b(1)(c).
Grand Parent Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendant, their daughter-in-law, seeking to establish grandparenting time with Joshua's two children.

The grand parents and the mother (parties) entered into a stipulated settlement to address grandparenting time visitation at a hearing.

DID YOU KNOW?
… an agreement that is read in open court is binding on the parties under MCR
2.507(G).1 “Judgments entered pursuant to the agreement of the parties are of the nature of a contract, rather than a judicial order entered against one party.” Massachusetts Indemnity & Life Ins Co v Thomas, 206 Mich App 265, 268; 520 NW2d 708 (1994). Absent a showing of fraud or duress, it is appropriate for a court to enforce the terms of the parties’ agreement. Id. “The litigant who so asserts to a stipulation freely entered into in open court carries a heavy burden of persuasion. Every presumption of judicial care, or professional competence, and of decretal stability is against the overthrow, in the appellate court, of such stipulation and of orders and MCR 2.507(G), formerly MCR 2.507(H) states: An agreement or consent between the parties or their attorneys respecting the proceedings in an action, subsequently denied by either party, is not binding unless it was made in open court, or unless evidence of the agreement is in writing, subscribed by the party against whom the agreement is offered or by that party’s attorney. [MCR 2.507(G).

Mom’s Attorney Defense counsel stated in open court, "It is a fair and accurate full statement of the agreement of the parties of the settlement."

After the Grandparents (plaintiffs) filed a motion for entry of an order and a hearing, an order memorializing the agreement was entered.

Later, mom changed her minds (defendant) filed a motion for JNOV or a new trial alleging she was under duress at the time she reached the settlement, she did not understand what she was agreeing to, and it was not in the children's best interest to provide the level of grandparenting time specified in the agreement.

DID YOU KNOW YOU SHOULD BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU AGREE TO.

… defendant agreed to visitation time and entered a stipulated agreement on the record. Because defendant did not deny grandparenting time, plaintiffs’ burden to overcome the presumption provided by MCL 722.27b(4)(b) was never triggered. Essentially, defendant waived this presumption by agreeing to the grandparenting visitation time stipulation. Again, defendant may not benefit from a claim of error resulting from her own conduct. See Lewis, 258 Mich App at 210.

The Tuscola Circuit Court (trial court) denied the motion, holding the defendant was bound by the agreement placed on the record and it could not change the grandparenting time order without a showing of a change of circumstances.

The Tuscola Circuit court held defendant's challenge to the trial court's authority to order grandparenting time was without merit, as were her claims her due process rights were violated, and the grandparents were seeking to control the amount of visitation they have with the children in violation of MCL 722.27b(3)(b). The Michigan Court of Appeals agreed with the Tuscola Circuit Court (Affirmed).

Posted here by
Terry Bankert
http://attorneybankert.com

Girlfriend must give back ring but keep baby!

Flint Divorce Lawyer Terry Bankert received the following question from AVVO.

“My boyfriend gave me a promise ring on March 14th,2010 told me that the engagenent ring will come after. Now he wants the promise ring back, what are my rights and do i have yo give it back or was it a gift? He said I aint allowed to move any of me or my childs things out of here till i do. What do I do now?”

The ring is a conditional gift. It is not yours.

Some sources say you must give it back. “The engagement period is often a time of euphoria and bliss as two individuals build a relationship and contemplate one of the most important institutions in human society - marriage. ...

A majority of jurisdictions, to include Meyer V Mitnick 244 Mich App 244 , 2001 Michigan ,hold that where an engagement gift is given to a donee in contemplation of marriage, although absolute in form, it is conditional; the donor is entitled to return of the engagement gift upon breach of the engagement. ...

Prior to the surge of modern "no-fault" divorce proceedings, a majority of jurisdictions held or recognized that where the donor breaks the engagement, the donee has the right to possess the engagement ring or to recover its value. ...

The donor had filed a complaint in replevin alleging a conditional gift of a diamond engagement ring to the donee, where the donor had terminated the engagement one year later. ...


While a majority of lower courts recognize that where the donor breaks the engagement, the donee has the right to possess the engagement ring, it is important to recognize that these decisions predate the courts' extension of the policy that removes fault-finding from the personal-relationship dynamics of marriage and divorce to encompass that of broken engagements. ... “
I you have additional questions contact Terry Bankert at http://attorneybankert.com/

SHOULD MOM ON HEROIN SEE HER CHILD?

Flint Divorce Lawyer Terry Bankert was asked the following question through AVVO.

“Can my ex get me in trouble for not sending my son to his supervised visits.

My ex mother in-law has not obeyed the rules for the visits. She currently is not allowing my ex to go to her house due to various thefts and drama. During the past six months she has been to rehab, had documented heroin and other drug use, she has an ongoing protective services case, and she only has come to see him about half the time. Recently she hasn’t came to see him at all in the last few weeks. I was told that her caseworker is helping her file a complaint and that they are going to provide her with a lawyer. “

First I will restate it to clearly identify the actors for this answer and state several assumptions.

“Can my ex get me in trouble for not sending my son to his supervised visits.
My ex mother in-law has not obeyed the rules for the visits of my son with my sons mother.

ASSUMPTION Because there is an ongoing protective services case and she has a case worker it is assumed that there is an active CPS case with a placement with the father and mothers parenting time is supervised at the maternal grandmothers home.

She, my ex- mother in law, currently is not allowing my ex wife to go to her , the ex-mother in law, house due to various thefts and drama.

During the past six months she, the ex wife, has been to rehab, had documented heroin and other drug use, she has an ongoing protective services case, and she ,the ex wife, only has come to see him about half the time.

Recently she , the ex wife, has not came to see him at all in the last few weeks. I was told that her caseworker is helping her file a complaint and that they are going to provide her with a lawyer. “

The writer asked

“Can my ex get me in trouble for not sending my son to his supervised visits”

RESTATED Will the father be in violation of a court order if he does not send his son to the maternal grandmothers home as ordered in a child protective proceeding as ordered by the court at probably a contested pretrial. YES

ASSUMPTION The father has not denied the child to the maternal grand mother for the supervised parenting time.

The father will not be “ in trouble” if is the grand mother in breech. If the child has a loving relationship with the grand mother why stop sending the child. The grand mother will have to explain her actions at the next contested pretrial. The father should contact the case worker directly to establish that he is not withholding the child. The father should monitor the child protective proceedings.

Child protective proceedings and their orders are temporary in nature unless there is an order for termination of parental right. The domestic order that establishes parentage, child custody and parenting time is permanent. It is superseded by the Child protective order but will return when the child proactive case is closed. The father if he does not already have it should seek a change in custody of the child to him self and supervised parenting time to the mother.
For further explanation please contact me directly.

Terry Bankert
http://attorneybankert.com/

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